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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALICE McJUNKIN, formerly 
ALICE RODRIGUEZ, and 
MYRNA RODRIGUEZ, a 
Minor, by her Guardian, ALICE 
McJUNKIN, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Case No. 9150 
vs. 
HAZEL CHASE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts in Appellants' Brief is 
relatively complete and contains most of the essen-
tial facts shown by the evidence. Although much 
of it emphasizes the evidence supporting plaintiffs' 
theory of the case, it is in the nature of argument. 
We will not repeat all of the facts set forth in Ap-
pellants' statement but will point out the areas of 
disagreement and direct the attention of the Court 
to any additional evidence which we believe neces-
sary for a more complete picture. 
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Appellants' summary of the pleadings fai1s to 
mention that, at the pretrial the court permitted 
the defendant to amend her answer to plead assump-
tion of risk. 
"Defendant alleges that the plaintiff en-
tered upon the trip with her driver, Vernon 
Green, as a joy ride, and that she by reason 
of the circumstances assumed the :risk of in-
jury and damage to her person under certain 
circumstances which defendant relies on, con-
sisting of the following: 
(a) By continuing to ride on the motor-
cycle when it was being driven at an excessive 
rate of speed and in a manner showing that 
the driver could not control it or bring it to 
a stop in the event of danger; 
(b) Also by failing to protest and get 
off the vehicle before the accident occurred." 
The plaintiff, Myrna Rodriguez, had an oppor-
tunity after first getting on the motorcyCle with 
Green, to get off at the gas station and thereby 
avoid exposing herself to the hazard of riding on it, 
which ultimately led to her injury ( R. 213). Ac-
cording to the testimony of Green, the two had 
ridden only a couple of short blocks before they 
stopped. Green said that between the time they 
left Second A venue and the time they pulled into 
the filling station, that Myrna Rodriguez had asked 
him to slow down. He testified that when he turned 
the motorcycle, it was necessary to lean, and that 
on the second corner he turned, he began picking up 
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speed as he came out of the lean after turning the 
corner, and she asked him to slow down. (R. 213) 
Mter this first experience, which indicates that 
she was frightened, they stopped at the service 
station for gas. After leaving the station Myrna 
testified tha:t she had not protested the manner in 
which Green drove the motorcyc1e or its speed 
(T. 206). Her further testimony that Green oper-
ated the motorcycle in a careful and prudent man-
ner was disputed by the witness Ahnberg, and was 
contrary to the undisputed physical evidence of the 
force of the impact. 
The contention is made in Appellants' Brief 
that the Chase car hit the last half of Green's motor-
cycle from the engine back. This statement appears 
at page 10 of the Appellants' Brief. We contend 
that the evidence shows that Green's motorcycle ran 
into the extreme left front of the bumper on the 
Chase car. That the two photographs, Defendant's 
Exhibits 19 and 21, clearly show tha:t the motor-
cycle ran into the Chase car and that it was not 
damaged in the back half, behind the engine, as 
claimed by the Appellants. An examination of these 
two Exhibits clearly shows tha:t no damage was 
done to the exhaust pipe on the right-hand rear 
of the motorcycle. 
Respondent points out also the difference be-
tween photographs introduced on behalf of the plain-
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tiff, Exhibits 5, 6, and 7, and Exhibit 26 introduced 
on behalf of the defendant, showing the condition 
of weed and foliage existing at the time of the 
accident as compared with the condition existing at 
the time the plaintiffs' photographs were taken. 
It is manifest that the condition existing at the time 
this accident occurred would have an adverse effect 
on the ability of the driver of each vehicle to see 
the other. 
The accident happened about 8 :30 P.M. The 
view of a westbound motorist south on I Street 
from points near the location of the stop sign on 
the northeast corner of the intersection was ex-
tremely limited. The grade dropped off sudden1y 
about 25 feet south of 11th Avenue (T. 144, Exhi-
bit D-26) ; also, the view of a motorist traveling 
north on I Street, looking east on 11th Avenue, was 
extremely limited because of the hill, weeds grow-
ing in the parking, and the foliage of a tree (Ex-
hibit D-27). Apparently recognizing the hazard, the 
City had placed a "slow sign" approximately 130 
feet south of the south curb of 11th Avenue on the 
east side of I Street as a warning to motorists 
traveling up the hill on I Street toward the inter-
section. 
The physical facts showed that when the motor-
cycle struck the defendant's car on the forward 
end of the left front bumper (Exhibit 15), the force 
·~ 
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of the in1pact was sufficient to bend the front 
bumper assembly on the car to the right (direction 
in which the motorcycle was traveling- Exhibits 
28, 29, and 30), and propel the plaintiff from the 
point of impact in the center of the intersection 
in a northwest direction to the parking between 
the west curb and the east side of the sidewalk, 
near the light pole. (T. 249, 267), a distance of 
approximately 50 feet (Exhibit P-1). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE NEGLIGENCE OF GREEN WAS THE SOLE 
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION AND OF 
PLAINTIFF'S INJURY. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE JUSTIFIED THE SUBMISSION 
OF INSTRUCTIONS ON ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE NEGLIGENCE OF GREEN WAS THE SOLE 
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION AND OF 
PLAINTIFF'S INJURY. 
Respondent's argument in support of Point I 
is supported by the physical facts disclosed by the 
record. 
First there should be considered the question 
of the speed at which Green was traveling at the 
time of this impact. The witness who was in the 
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best position other than Green and the plaintiff, 
Myrna Rodriguez, to see the motorcycle and give 
an opinion as to its speed, was Carl H. Ahnberg. 
He was approximate'ly 50 feet from the intersec-
tion of I Street and 11th Avenue, proceeding east 
( T. 246). He was asked to estimate the speed of 
the motorcycle before it hit the Chase car. His testi-
mony in that regard is as follows, from the Record 
(R. 247): 
"Q. At that time did you form an esti-
mate as to the speed of the r.aotorcycle before 
it hit the car? 
"A. Well, I figured between 40 and 50 
miles an hour, the way it looked." 
Assuming for purposes of argument that Ahn-
berg was correct in his estimate of the speed of the 
vehicle on which the plaintiff, Myrna Rodriguez, 
was riding, certainly it was at a rate too fast to 
permit the driver to control his vehicle and to avoid 
the accident. In this connection, the Court's attention 
is again directed to the evidence showing the dis-
tance Myrna was hurled through the air by the 
force of the collision. The witness Ahnberg testified 
(R. 247, 248) that after the impact, she went 
through the air something like "superman" to a 
point on the parking near the 'light pole on the 
northeast corner of the intersection. Even though 
the motorcycle struck the automobile a glancing 
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blow, the initial impact being on the left front 
fender, the force was sufficient to bend the whole 
bumper assembly to the right (Exhibits 15, 28, 
29, 30). 
I Street is a steep slope from 1Oth Avenue to 
11th Avenue. The streets are relatively narrow, and 
visibility is extremely limited. Certainly, under these 
circumstances, it was negligence on the part of 
Green to proceed at that speed. It follows that, if 
the defendant, Chase, was nat negligent, that the 
injury which came to the plaintiff, Myrna Rod-
riguez, "\Vas solely and proximately caused by the 
negligence of Green. 
After visiting This Is the Place Monument, de-
fendant was proceeding west on 11th A venue (Trial 
1.69). There was a cool breeze at the Monument, 
so she had raised the window in the automobile 
on her side, which was still up when the accident 
happened (Trial 171). When she reached the inter-
section of 11th Avenue and I Street, she stopped 
for the stop sign (Trial 194). 
After having stopped, she moved slowly into 
the intersection, looking both to the right and to 
the left without seeing any approaching vehicle from 
either north or south (R. 194). Having ascertained 
that it was safe to do so, she proceeded through the 
intersection to a point almost at its center, when 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the left front of her car was struck by the motor-
cycle driven by Green. 
The defendant did not hear the sound of the 
aproaching motorcycle before the collision. Her first 
intimation of the danger was when it suddenly came 
into view from her left, over the brow of the hill 
and into the intersection (Trial 178) . It was not 
sufficiently dark for the motorcycle to display a 
beam of light in front of it. At the moment of im-
pact, her car was going slowly. She applied her 
brakes and stopped immediately. (Trial 189). The 
witness, Mrs. Armstrong, who was driving a car 
west behind the vehicle driven by 'the defendant, 
heard the sound of the motorcycle but didn't know 
the direction from v;hich it was coming. She re-
membered being stopped on the east side of the 
intersection ''with an apprehensive feeling as a fire 
engine makes you feel when you hear the noise 
that you don't see" (Trial 151). At this time the 
defendant's automobile was in the center of the 
intersection. What could she have done to avoid 
the col'lision, had she heard the sound of the motor-
cycle and known the direction from which it was 
coming? Considering the emergency, she was vir-
tually helpless to avoid the collision. 
The section of our Statute which delineates the 
rights and obligations of the drivers under circum-
stances where one travels on an arterial or through 
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highway and the other on a highway regulated 
by stop signs is 41-67 4 Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
which is set forth in the Appellant's Brief. For the 
purposes of this argument, there is set forth the 
language of Subsection (a) of that Section : 
"VEHICLE ENTERING A THROUGH 
HIGHWAY- The driver of a vehicle shall 
stop as required by this act at the entrance 
to a through highway and shall yi~ld the 
right of way to other vehicles which· have en-
tered the intersection from said through high-
way or which are approaching so closely on 
said through high,Nay as to constitute an im-
mediate hazard, but said driver, having so 
yielded, may proceed; and the drivers of aJll 
other vehicles approaching the intersection on 
said through highway shall yield the right of 
way to the vehicle so proceeding into or across 
the through highway." (Italics ours) 
Of necessity, this section has · frequen~ly been 
construed by this court relative to the rights and 
duties of drivers facing a situation at the scene of 
this collision. It is the obvious intention of this sec-
tion that one stopping for a stop sign need not be 
required to remain there forever yielding the right 
of way to any vehicles which might be approaching 
on the through highway. In the case of Smith v. 
Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, 279 P. 893, this Court in con-
struing a Salt Lake City Ordinance modeled after 
the foregoing statute, held that after a driver en-
tering a through street had stopped in compliance 
with a stop sign, he could then proceed through the 
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intersection on the assumption that vehicles ap-
proaching on a through street would yield the right 
of way. 
"If the respondent stopped immediately 
before entering Highland drive, he complied 
with all the requirements of the ordinance. 
From that moment he was free to move with-
out restriction, so far as the ordinance is con-
cerned. As he approached Highland drive, 
after stopping, the statute gave him the right 
of way as against automobiles coming in the 
direction the respondent was traveling, and 
made it the duty of such persons approaching 
from 'the left to yield the right of way." 
In Conklin v. Walsh, 19'3 P. 2 437, the opinion 
contains the following language, which is certainly 
familiar to this Court: 
"The duty to keep a proper lookout ap-
plies as well to the favored as to the disfavored 
driver. Neither driver can excuse his own 
failure to observe because the other driver 
fai1led in his duty. Neither driver is at any 
time to be excused for want of vigilance or 
failure to see what is plain to be seen. Drivers 
are permitted to cross over arterial highways 
after having stopped. True, they must yield 
the right of way to cars which are close 
enough to constitute an immediate hazard. 
This rule, however, requires the exercise of 
some judgment. There is still a duty on the 
part of the driver traveling the arterial high-
way to remain reasonably alert to the pos-
sibility of the disfavored driver starting 
across the intersection in the belief that he 
can cross in safety. The duty of keeping a 
proper lookout attends all those operating mo-
JO 
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tor vehic1es, and other rules of the road do ndt 
relieve any driver of the necessity of comply-
ing with this requirement." 
See also Bat,es v. Burns, 3 Utah 2 180, 
281 P. 2 209. 
The Respondent, therefore, contends that it was 
the negligence of Green '\Vhich was the sole, proxi-
mate cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, 
Myrna Rodriguez. It is the further contention of the 
Respondent that the defendant was not negligent 
in any particular, and therefore her conduct could 
not have contributed to the injury of the plaintiff. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE JUSTIFIED THE SUBMISSION 
OF INSTRUCTIONS ON ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
We agree w!th the statement from Clay v. Dun-
ford, 121 Ut. 177, 239 P. 2 1075, and Johnson v. 
Maynard, 9 Ut. 2 268, 342 P. 2 884, that for the 
doctrine of Assumption of Risk to apply, the plain-
tiff must ndt only know and appreciate the danger 
but voluntarily put herself in the way of it. We 
submit that the evidence in this case showed that 
is exactly what Myrna did. She had been on a motor-
cycle before (R. 198). From her reside:nce to the 
service station was a relatively short ride, during 
which she became frightened and requested that 
Green not drive so fast. At that time he was driving 
about 40 miles per hour (R. 210). When they stopped 
11 
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at the service station, she had an opportunity to 
'leave the motorcycle. Mter they proceeded from the 
service station, the plaintiff testified tha;t she made 
no protest as to the speed at which Green drove the 
motorcycle ( R. 206). She did not ask him how fast 
they were going ( R. 207) . In going up the hill she 
said that Green was not going fast. Considering the 
physical evidence and the testimony of the defen-
dant's witnesses, the jury were not required to be-
lieve Myrna's testimony that the motorcycle was 
not going fast up the hill, and aparently did not 
do so. This was a residential neighborhood; it was 
still dusk; the motorcycle could have been stopped 
any place along I Street and Myrna dismounted, 
had she protested or made any effort to get Green 
to stop or even slow down. Her statement to Green 
in the presence of the witnesses on the scene after 
the accident that she hated him ; that she had told 
him not to go so fast, showed an awareness of the 
danger. She did not say that she had requested him 
to stop and let her off; and according to her, the 
only protest she made was before they stopped for 
gasoline, not after. The jury was entitled to accept 
her statement that she didn't protest after stopping 
at the service station and conclude that she should 
have done so and made some effort to terminate the 
ride, considering the evidence of the motorcycle's 
speed as shown by Ahnberg's testimony and the 
12 
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physical facts. We submit there is a wide divergence 
in the facts of this situation and in the facts of 
Johnson v. Maynard and Clay v. Dunford, supra. 
Liability should not be imposed on the defen-
dant in this case, vvhose conduct has been reviewed 
in the argument under this point, when proceeding 
lawfully through the intersection, her car was struck 
by a motorcycle catapulting into the intersection at 
a speed between 40 and 50 miles per hour. There is 
no evidence that her conduct was other than that 
of a reasonable person under the circumstances. 
The case of Maybee v. Maybee, 11 P. 2 973, 
discusses the appUcation of assumption of risk to 
facts which are analogous to the ones in this case. 
In tha:t case a daughter sued her mother for per-
sonal injuries received when her mother ran into 
a chuckhole in the automobile in which they were 
driving, overturning the car, and injuring the plain-
tiff. The evidence showed that the mother was near-
sighted and was driving without her glasses because 
they were broken. The daughter knew of the de-
fective condition of her mother's eyesight and was 
aware that her mother had been driving for some 
time on the day of the accident without her glasses. 
The trial court directed a verdict in favor of 
the defendant and against the plaintiff, no cause of 
action, from which the plaintiff appealed, and the 
trial court's action was affirmed by this court. In 
13 
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the decision, the court had the following to say at 
page 975 of 11 P. 2: 
"If it was negligence for the defendant 
to drive at this speed, ( 45 miles per hour), 
with her vision impaired as it was, and with-
out the a:id of glasses, it would fdllow that 
where all these facts are fully known to and 
appreciated by the plaintiff, and notwith-
standing such facts and such knowledge, she 
was willing to be driven in the car, she not 
only asumed the risk or hazard to her own 
safety which resulted from such driving but by 
her acquiescense was guilty of independent 
negligence which contributed to the accident." 
The opinion further employs a quotation from 
the earlier case of Atwood v. Railway Company, 140 
P. 137. The quotation from that case is as follows: 
"It no doubt is the law, as contended by 
appellant's counsel, that every occupant of 
the vehicle in which he is riding must always 
exercise ordinary care for his own safety, 
and if by the exercise of such care he could 
avoid injury to himself but fails to do so, he 
cannot recover, regardless of the fact that he 
has no control or direction of the vehicle in 
which he was riding at the tin1e of the acci-
dent and injury." 
In this case the plaintiff, knowingly entrusted 
her safety to Green, whose method of operating the 
motorcycle had caused her to remonstrate with him 
about the speed and caused her to be frightened. 
She had an opportunity to avoid riding farther 
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with him, which she did not take. The evidence 
indicates that he did not slacken speed but was 
driving imprudently and at an excessive rate of 
speed when the accident happened. The Appe'llant's 
Brief is replete with references to her statement 
immediately thereafter that she had told him to 
slow down. 
A more recent Utah case, Esernia v. Overland 
Moving Company, 206 P. 2 621, involved an action 
by a guest passenger in the Overland Truck for 
personal injuries received by him when the truck 
overturned. He and his companion were invited to 
ride by the Overland driver from Nevada to Salt 
Lake City. They were advised when the ride began, 
by the driver, that he was tired and sleepy and at 
one point before the accident occurred, he had be-
come drowsy and almost run off the road. 
The trial court directed a verdict in favor of 
the defendants, and this court affirmed the verdict 
and judgment. The decision employs the following 
language, which we feel is appUcable to the situa-
tion here: 
"A factor of particular importance is 
the extent of the known incompetence or care-
lessness of the driver or the bad condition of 
the car as compared with the disadvantages 
of the position in which the plain tiff will be if 
he leaves the car. Thus, if the incompetence 
of the driver is discovered at a point at which 
the plaintiff might obtain other means of 
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transportation, or without danger or serious 
inconvenience, walk home, or to his destina-
tion, it would be contributory negligence to 
continue in the car." 
We have previously referred to the failure by 
the plaintiff to avail herself of the opportunity to 
walk home and not continue riding with a motor-
cyc1e driver whose driving she feared, and thus avoid 
injury to herself. 
In the case of Wold v. Ogden City, 258 P. 2 
453, 12'3 Ut. 270, there is a discussion of the prin-
ciple of assumption of risk. Justice Henroid uses 
the following language in the opinion: 
"The doctrine of assumption of risk ori-
ginally applicable to employer-employee re-
lations, has been extended to some situations 
where one knows of a condition and concludes 
to accept its attendant hazards and acts ac-
cordingly without force of necessity." 
The opinion continues with a reference to a 
statement by Dean Prosser in his work on Torts, 
and says as follows: 
"Dean Prosser points up the principle 
as it app1ies to the instant case when he as-
serts that an objective standard must main-
tain, and that the plaintiff cannot be heard 
to say that he did not comprehend a risk which 
must have been obvious to him. Further that, 
as in the case of negligence, there are certain 
risks which any one of adult age must be 
taken to appreciate: The danger of slipping on 
ice, or falling through unguarded openings." 
lfl 
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He goes on to say that: 
"In the usual case, his knowledge and 
appreciation of the danger will be a question 
for the jury; but where it is clear tha:t any 
person of normal intelligence in his position 
must have understood the danger, the issue 
must be decided by the court." 
Marshall v. Taylor, 8 Ut. 2 29, 32'7 P. 2 262, 
decided in 1958, held 'tha:t plaintiffs, who had placed 
themselves in a position of peril by holding on to the 
handles of the defendant's automobile and then re-
fusing to let go until forced to do so by the in-
creased speed of the automobile, were negligent and 
assumed the risk of injury as a matter of law. The 
court said: 
"We are forced to the conclusion that the 
plaintiffs were negligent; and they, in plac-
ing themselves in a position of peril, assumed 
the risk of injury." 
In that case, plain tiffs could not foresee the 
exact manner in which they might be injured, but 
certainly they could anticipate that injury was prob-
able. So say we here. Myrna's conduct in remaining 
on the motorcycle after leaving the service station 
justified an assumption of risk and contributory 
negligence. Under the evidence, the jury could find 
her guilty of one or the other. Further considering 
the evidence of defendant's conduct, indicating she 
was not negligent as a matter of law, the instruc-
tions could not have been prejudicial to the plaintiff. 
17 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is the contention of the Res-
pondent that the evidence more than justified the 
jury verdict of No Cause of Action. Further, the 
Respondent maintains that the evidence would have 
justified a directed verdict in favor of the defen-
dant and Respondent and against the plaintiff. In 
no event under all the facts and circumstances of 
this case, was the plaintiff prejudiced in any way 
by the submision of the court's instructions. 
In support of this conclusion, we quote the lan-
guage of the opinion in the recent case of Joseph 
v. W. H. Groves Latter Day Saints Hospital, 348 
P. 2 935: 
''What the parties are en titled to and the 
law seeks to afford is an opportunity for one 
chiim'ing a grievance which would justify 
legal redress to present it to a court or jury 
and have a fair trial. When this is done, and 
the verdict and judgment are entered, all pre-
sumptions are in favor of their validity. The 
burden is upon the appellant not only to show 
that there was error but that it was pre-
judici~l to the extent that there is reason-
able likelihood that in its absence there would 
have been a different result. We find no such 
error here." 
The Respondent feels that the Appellant has 
ndt sustained the burden which is described in that 
quotation, and respectfully submits that the verdict 
lR 
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and judgment therein in the tria1 court should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN 
Attorneys for 
D,ejendant and Respondent 
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